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Abstract
The declining price anomaly states that the price weakly decreases when multiple copies of
an item are sold sequentially over time. The anomaly has been observed in a plethora of practical
applications. On the theoretical side, Gale and Stegeman [11] proved that the anomaly is guaranteed
to hold in full information sequential auctions with exactly two buyers. We prove that the declining
price anomaly is not guaranteed in full information sequential auctions with three or more buyers.
This result applies to both first-price and second-price sequential auctions. Moreover, it applies
regardless of the tie-breaking rule used to generate equilibria in these sequential auctions. To prove
this result we provide a refined treatment of subgame perfect equilibria that survive the iterative
deletion of weakly dominated strategies and use this framework to experimentally generate a very
large number of random sequential auction instances. In particular, our experiments produce an
instance with three bidders and eight items that, for a specific tie-breaking rule, induces a non-
monotonic price trajectory. Theoretic analyses are then applied to show that this instance can
be used to prove that for every possible tie-breaking rule there is a sequential auction on which
it induces a non-monotonic price trajectory. On the other hand, our experiments show that non-
monotonic price trajectories are extremely rare. In over six million experiments only a 0.000183
proportion of the instances violated the declining price anomaly.
1 Introduction
In a sequential auction identical copies of an item are sold over time. In a private values model with
unit-demand, risk neutral buyers, Milgrom and Weber [22, 31] showed that the sequence of prices forms
a martingale. In particular, expected prices are constant over time.1 In contrast, on attending a wine
auction, Ashenfelter [1] made the surprising observation that prices for identical lots declined over
time: “The law of the one price was repealed and no one even seemed to notice!” This declining price
anomaly was also noted in sequential auctions for the disparate examples of livestock (Buccola [7]),
Picasso prints (Pesando and Shum [24]) and satellite transponder leases (Milgrom and Weber [22]).
Indeed, the possibility of decreasing prices in a sequential auction was raised by Sosnick [27] nearly
sixty years ago. An assortment of reasons have been given to explain this anomaly. In the case of wine
auctions, proposed causes include absentee buyers utilizing non-optimal bidding strategies (Ginsburgh
[13]) and the buyer’s option rule where the auctioneer may allow the buyer of the first lot to make
additional purchases at the same price (Black and de Meza [6]). Minor non-homogeneities amongst the
items can also lead to falling prices. For example, in the case of art prints the items may suffer slight
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1If the values are affiliated then prices can have an upwards drift.
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imperfections or wear-and-tear; as a consequence, the auctioneer may sell the prints in decreasing
order of quality (Pesando and Shum [24]). More generally, a decreasing price trajectory may arise due
to risk-aversion, such as non-decreasing, absolute risk-aversion (McAfee and Vincent [20]) or aversion
to price-risk (Mezzetti [21]); see also Hu and Zou [15]. Further potential economic and behavioural
explanations have been provided in [13, 3, 29].
Of course, most of these explanations are context-specific. However, the declining price anomaly
appears more universal. In fact, in practice the anomaly is ubiquitous: It has now been observed in
sequential auctions for antiques (Ginsburgh and van Ours [14]), commercial real estate (Lusht [18]),
condominiums (Ashenfelter and Genesove [2]), fish (Gallegati et al. [12]), flowers (van den Berg et al.
[30]), fur (Lambson and Thurston [17]), lobsters (Salladarre et al. [26]), jewellery (Chanel et al. [9]),
paintings (Beggs and Graddy [5]), stamps (Thiel and Petry [28]) and wool (Burns [8]).
Given the plethora of examples, the question arises as whether this property is actually an anomaly.
In groundbreaking work, Gale and Stegeman [11] proved that it is not in sequential auctions with two
bidders. Specifically, in second-price sequential auctions with two multiunit-demand buyers, prices
are weakly decreasing over time at the unique subgame perfect equilibrium that survives the iterative
deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Moreover, this result applies regardless of the valuation func-
tions of the buyers; the result also extends to the corresponding equilibrium in first-price sequential
auctions. It is worth highlighting here two important aspects of the model studied in [11]. First,
Gale and Stegeman consider multiunit-demand buyers whereas prior theoretical work had focussed
on the simpler setting of unit-demand buyers. As well as being of more practical relevance (see the
many examples above), multiunit-demand buyers can implement more sophisticated bidding strate-
gies. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that equilibria in multiunit-demand setting may possess more
interesting properties than equilibria in the unit-demand setting. Second, they study an auction with
full information. The restriction to full information is extremely useful here as it separates away
informational aspects. Hence, it allows one to focus on the strategic properties caused purely by the
sequential sales of items and not by a lack of information.
1.1 Results and Overview of the Paper
The result of Gale and Stegeman [11] prompts the question of whether or not the declining price
anomaly is guaranteed to hold in general, that is, in sequential auctions with more than two buyers.
We answer this question in the negative by exhibiting a sequential auction with three buyers and eight
items where prices initially rise and then fall. In order to run our experiments that find this counter-
example (to the conjecture that prices are weakly decreasing for multi-buyer sequential auctions) we
study in detail the form of equilibria in sequential auctions. First, it is important to note that there
is a fundamental distinction between sequential auctions with two buyers and sequential auctions
with three or more buyers. In the former sequential auction, each subgame reduces to a standard
auction with independent valuations. We explain this in Section 2.1, where we present the two-
buyer full information model of Gale and Stegeman [11]. In contrast, in a multi-buyer sequential
auction each subgame reduces to an auction with interdependent valuations. This is explained in
Section 2.2 after we present the extension of the model of [11] to multi-buyer sequential auctions.
Consequently to study multi-buyer sequential auctions we must study the equilibria of auctions with
interdependent valuations. A theory of such equilibria was recently developed by Paes Leme et al. [23]
via a correspondence with an ascending price mechanism. In particular, as we discuss in Section 2.3,
the ascending price mechanism outputs a unique bid value, called the dropout bid βi, for each buyer i.
For first-price auctions it is known [23] that these dropout bids form a subgame perfect equilibrium
and, moreover, the interval [0, βi] is the exact set of bids that survives all processes consisting of
the iterative deletion of strategies that are weakly dominated. In contrast, we show in Appendix A
that for second-price auctions it may be the case that no bids survive the iterative deletion of weakly
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dominated strategies; however, we prove in Section 2.3 that the interval [0, βi] is the exact set of bids
for any losing buyer that survives all processes consisting of the iterative deletion of strategies that
are weakly dominated by a lower bid.
In Section 3 we describe the counter-example. We emphasize that there is nothing unusual about
our example. The form of the valuation functions used for the buyers are standard, namely, weakly de-
creasing marginal valuations. Furthermore, the non-monotonic price trajectory does not arise because
of the use of an artificial tie-breaking rule; the three most natural tie-breaking rules, see Section 2.4,
all induce the same non-monotonic price trajectory. Indeed, we present an even stronger result in
Section 4: for any tie-breaking rule, there is a sequential auction on which it induces a non-monotonic
price trajectory.
This lack of weakly decreasing prices provides an explanation for why multi-buyer sequential auc-
tions have been hard to analyze quantitatively. We provide a second explanation in Section 4.3. There
we present a three-buyer sequential auction that does satisfy weakly decreasing prices but which has
subgames where some agent has a negative value from winning against one of the two other agents.
Again, this contrasts with the two-buyer case where every agent always has a non-negative value from
winning against the other agent in every subgame.
Finally in Section 5, we describe the results obtained via our large scale experimentations. These
results show that whilst the declining price anomaly is not universal, exceptions are extremely rare.
Specifically, from a randomly generated dataset of over six million sequential auctions only a 0.000183
proportion of the instances produced non-monotonic price trajectories. Consequently, these experi-
ments are consistent with the practical examples discussed in the introduction. Of course, it is perhaps
unreasonable to assume that subgame equilibria arise in practice; we remark, though, that the use
of simple bidding algorithms by bidders may also lead to weakly decreasing prices in a multi-buyer
sequential auction. For example, Rodriguez [25] presents a method called the residual monopsonist
procedure inducing this property.
2 The Sequential Auction Model
Here we present the full information sequential auction model. There are T identical items and
n buyers. Exactly one item is sold in each time period over T time periods. Buyer i has a value Vi(k)
for winning exactly k items. Thus Vi(k) =
∑k
ℓ=1 vi(ℓ), where vi(ℓ) is the marginal value buyer i has for
obtaining an ℓth item. This induces an extensive form game. To analyze this game it is informative
to begin by considering the 2-buyer case, as studied by Gale and Stegeman [11].
2.1 The Two-Buyer Case
During the auction, the relevant history is the number of items each buyer has currently won. Thus
we may compactly represent the extensive form (“tree”) of the auction using a directed graph with
a node (x1, x2) for any pair of non-negative integers that satisfies x1 + x2 ≤ T . The node (x1, x2)
induces a subgame with T − x1− x2 items for sale and where each buyer i already possesses xi items.
Note there is a source node, (0, 0), corresponding to the whole game, and sink nodes (x1, x2), where
x1 + x2 = T . The values Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 have for a sink node (x1, x2) are Π1(x1, x2) = V1(x1)
and Π2(x1, x2) = V2(x2), respectively. We want to evaluate the values (utilities) at the source node
(0, 0). We can do this recursively working from the sinks upwards. Take a node (x1, x2), where
x1 + x2 = T − 1. This node corresponds to the final round of the auction, where the last item is sold,
given that each buyer i has already won xi items. The node (x1, x2) will have directed arcs to the
sink nodes (x1 + 1, x2) and (x1, x2 + 1); these arcs correspond to Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 winning the
final item, respectively. For the case of second-price auctions, it is then a weakly dominant strategy
for Buyer 1 to bid its marginal value v1(x1 + 1) = V1(x1 + 1) − V1(x1); similarly for Buyer 2. Of
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course, this marginal value is just v1(x1 + 1) = Π1(x1 + 1, x2) − Π1(x1, x2 + 1), the difference in
value between winning and losing the final item. If Buyer 1 is the highest bidder at (x1, x2), that is,
Π1(x1 + 1, x2)−Π1(x1, x2 + 1) ≥ Π2(x1, x2 + 1)−Π2(x1 + 1, x2), then we have that
Π1(x1, x2) = Π1(x1 + 1, x2)−
(
Π2(x1, x2 + 1)−Π2(x1 + 1, x2)
)
Π2(x1, x2) = Π2(x1 + 1, x2)
Symmetric formulas apply if Buyer 2 is the highest bidder at (x1, x2). Hence we may recursively define
a value for each buyer for each node. The iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies then
leads to a subgame perfect equilibrium [11, 4].
Example: Consider a two-buyer sequential auction with two items, where the marginal valuations are
{v1(1), v1(2)} = {10, 8} and {v2(1), v2(2)} = {6, 3}. This game is illustrated in Figure 1. The base
case with the values of the sink nodes is shown in Figure 1(a). The first row in each node refers to
Buyer 1 and shows the number of items won (in plain text) and the corresponding value (in bold); the
second row refers to Buyer 2. The outcome of the second-price sequential auction, solved recursively,
is then shown in Figure 1(b). Arcs are labelled by the bid value; here arcs for Buyer 1 point left and
arcs for Buyer 2 point right. Solid arcs represent winning bids and dotted arcs are losing bids. The
equilibrium path is shown in bold.
(a) 0 : -0 : -
1 : -
0 : -
0 : -
1 : -
2 : 18
0 : 0
1 : 10
1 : 6
0 : 0
2 : 9
(b) 0 : 70 : 1
1 : 12
0 : 0
0 : 7
1 : 6
2 : 18
0 : 0
1 : 10
1 : 6
0 : 0
2 : 9
5 6
8 6 10 3
Figure 1: Second-Price Sequential Auction
Observe that the declining price anomaly is exhibited in this example. Specifically, in this subgame
perfect equilibrium, Buyer 2 wins the first item for a price 5 and Buyer 1 wins the second item for
a price 3. As stated, this example is not an exception. Gale and Stegeman [11] showed that weakly
decreasing prices are a property of 2-buyer sequential auctions.
Theorem 2.1. [11] In a 2-buyer second-price sequential auction there is a unique equilibrium that
survives the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Moreover, at this equilibrium prices are
weakly declining.
We remark that the subgame perfect equilibrium that survives the iterative elimination of weakly
dominated strategies is unique in terms of the values at the nodes. Moreover, given a fixed tie-breaking
rule, the subgame perfect equilibrium also has a unique equilibrium path in each subgame.
In addition, Theorem 2.1 also applies to first-price sequential auctions. In this case, to ensure the
existence of an equilibrium, we make the standard assumption that there is a fixed small bidding
increment. That is, for any price p there is a unique maximum price smaller than p. Given this, for
the example above, the subgame perfect equilibrium using a first-price sequential auction is as shown
in Figure 2. Here we use the notation p+ to denote a winning bid of value equal to p, and the notation
p to denote a losing bid equal to maximum value smaller than p.
Observe that the resultant prices on the equilibrium path are more easily apparent in Figure 2 than
in Figure 1. For this reason, all the figures we present in the rest of the paper will be for first-price
auctions; equivalent figures can can be drawn for the case of second-price auctions.
So the decreasing price anomaly holds in two-buyer sequential auctions. The question of whether
or not it applies to sequential auctions with more than two buyers remained open. We resolve this
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0 : 7
0 : 1
1 : 12
0 : 0
0 : 7
1 : 6
2 : 18
0 : 0
1 : 10
1 : 6
0 : 0
2 : 9
5 5+
6+ 6 3+ 3
Figure 2: First-Price Sequential Auction
question in the rest of this paper. To do this, let’s first study equilibria in the full information sequential
auction model when there are more than two buyers.
2.2 The Multi-Buyer Case
The underlying model of [11] extends simply to sequential auctions with n ≥ 3 buyers. There is a node
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) for each set of non-negative integers satisfying
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ T . There is a directed arc
from (x1, x2, . . . , xn) to (x1, x2, . . . , xj−1, xj + 1, xj+1, . . . xn) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Thus each non-sink
node has n out-going arcs. This is problematic: Whilst in the final time period each buyer has a
value for winning and a value for losing, this is no longer the case recursively in earlier time periods.
Specifically, buyer i has value for winning, but n− 1 (different) values for losing depending upon the
identity of the buyer j 6= i who actually wins. Thus rather than each node corresponding to a standard
auction, each node in the multi-buyer case corresponds to an auction with interdependent valuations.
Formally, an auction with interdependent valuations is a single-item auction where each buyer i has
a value vi,i for winning the item and, for each buyer j 6= i, buyer i has value vi,j if buyer j wins the
item. These auctions, also called auctions with externalities, were introduced by Funk [10] and by
Jehiel and Moldovanu [16]. Their motivations were applications where losing participants were not
indifferent to the identity of the winning buyer; examples include firms seeking to purchase a patented
innovation, take-over acquisitions of a smaller company in an oligopolistic market, and sports teams
competing to sign a star athlete.
Therefore to understand multi-buyer sequential auctions we must first understand equilibria in auc-
tions with interdependent valuations. This is actually not a simple task. Indeed such an understanding
was only recently provided by Paes Leme et al. [23].
2.3 Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Valuations
We can explain the result of [23] via an ascending price auction.
2.3.1 An Ascending Price Mechanism
Imagine a two-buyer ascending price auction where the valuations of the buyers are v1 > v2. The
requested price p starts at zero and continues to rise until the point where the second buyer drops
out. Of course, this happens when the price reaches v2, and so Buyer 1 wins for a payment p
+ = v2.
But this is exactly the outcome expected from a first-price auction: Buyer 2 loses with bid of p and
Buyer 1 wins with a bid of p+. To generalize this to multi-buyer settings we can view this process
as follows. At a price p, buyer i remains in the auction as long as there is at least one buyer j still
in the auction who buyer i is willing to pay a price p to beat; that is, vi,i − p > vi,j . The last buyer
to drop out wins at the corresponding price. For example, in the two-buyer example above, Buyer 2
drops out at price p = v2 as it would rather lose to Buyer 1 than win above that price. Therefore, at
price p+ there is no buyer still in the auction that Buyer 1 wishes to beat (because there are no other
buyers remaining in the auction at all!). Thus Buyer 1 drops out at p+ and, being the last buyer to
drop out, wins at that price.
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Observe that, even in the multi-buyer setting, this procedure produces a unique dropout bid βi for
each buyer i. To illustrate this, two auctions with interdependent valuations are shown in Figure 3.
In these diagrams the label of an arc from buyer i to buyer j is wi,j = vi,i − vi,j. That is, buyer i is
willing to pay up to wi,j to win if the alternative is that buyer j wins the item. Now consider running
our ascending price procedure for these auctions. In Figure 3(a), Buyer 1 drops out when the price
reaches 18. Since Buyer 1 is no longer active in the auction, Buyer 4 drops out when the price reaches
23. At this point, Buyer 2 and Buyer 3 are left to compete for the item. Buyer 3 wins when Buyer 2
drops out at price 31. Thus the drop-out bid of Buyer 2 is 31+. Observe that Buyer 2 loses despite
having very high values for winning (against Buyer 1 and Buyer 4).
The example of Figure 3(b) with dropout bid vector (β1, β2, β3, β4) = (24, 24, 24, 24
+) is more
subtle. Here Buyer 2 drops out at price 24. But Buyer 3 only wanted to beat Buyer 2 at this price
so it then immediately drops out at the same price. Now Buyer 1 only wanted to beat Buyer 2 and
Buyer 3 at this price, so it then immediately drops out at the same price. This leaves Buyer 4 the
winner at price 24+.
(a) Buyer 1
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
Buyer 4
18
13
14
97
31
74
33
12
11
10
23
35 (b) Buyer 1
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
Buyer 4
37
22
59
17
13
24
63
19
21
10
14
35
Figure 3: Drop-Out Bid Examples. In these two examples the dropout bid vectors (β1, β2, β3, β4)
are (18, 31, 31+ , 23) and (24, 24, 24, 24+), respectively.
2.3.2 Dropout Bids and the Iterative Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
As well as being solutions to the ascending price auction, the dropout bids have a much stronger
property that makes them the natural and robust prediction for auctions with interdependent val-
uations. Specifically, Paes Leme et al. [23] proved that, for each buyer i, the interval [0, βi] is the
set of strategies that survive any sequence consisting of the iterative deletion of weakly dominated
strategies. This is formalized as follows. Take an n-buyer game with strategy sets S1, S2, . . . , Sn and
utility functions ui : S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn → R. Then {S
τ
i }i,τ is a valid sequence for the iterative dele-
tion of weakly dominated strategies if for each τ there is a buyer i such that (i)Sτj = S
τ−1
j for each
buyer j 6= i and (ii)Sτi ⊂ S
τ−1
i where for each strategy si ∈ S
τ−1
i \ S
τ
i there is an sˆi ∈ S
τ
i such that
ui(sˆi, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) for all s−i ∈
∏
j:j 6=i S
τ
j , and with strict inequality for at least one s−i.
We say that a strategy si for buyer i survives the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies
if for any valid sequence {Sτi }i,τ we have si ∈
⋂
τ S
τ
i .
Theorem 2.2. [23] Given a first-price auction with interdependent valuations, for each buyer i, the
set of bids that survive the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies is exactly [0, βi].
An exact analogue of Theorem 2.2 does not hold for second-price auctions with interdependent
valuations. We prove this in Appendix A where we present an example in which the set of strategies
that survive the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies is empty in a second-price auction.
However, consideration of that example shows that the problem occurs when a strategy is deleted
because it is weakly dominated by a higher value bid. Observe that this can never happen for a
potentially winning bid in a first-price auction. Thus Theorem 2.2 still holds in first-price auctions
when we restrict attention to sequences consisting of the iterative deletion of strategies that are weakly
dominated by a lower bid. Indeed, we can prove the corresponding theorem also holds for second-price
auctions.
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Theorem 2.3. Given a second-price auction with interdependent valuations, for each losing buyer i,
the set of bids that survive the iterative deletion of strategies that are weakly dominated by a lower bid
is exactly [0, βi].
Proof. First we claim that for any losing buyer i and any price p > βi there is a sequence of iterative
deletions of strategies that are weakly dominated by a lower bid that leads to the deletion of bid p from
Sτi . Without loss of generality, we may order the buyers such that β1 ≤ β2 ≤ · · · ≤ βn; in the case of a
tie the buyers are placed in the order they were deleted by the tie-breaking rule. Initially S0i = [0,∞),
for each buyer i. We now define a valid sequence such that Sii = [0, βi]. We proceed by induction on
the label of the buyers. For the base case observe that for Buyer 1 we know β1 = max
j:j 6=i
(vi,i − vi,j) is
the highest price it wants to pay to beat anyone else. Suppose Buyer 1 bids p > β1. Take any set of
bids b−1 ∈ ×j:j≥2S
0
j . We have three cases:
(i) Both bids p and β1 are winning bids against b−1. Then, as this is a second-price auction, Buyer 1
is indifferent between the two bids.
(ii) Both bids p and β1 are losing bids against b−1. Then Buyer 1 is indifferent between the two bids.
(iii) Bid p is a winning bid but βi is a losing bid against b−1. Then since the winning price is at least
β1, Buyer 1 strictly prefers to lose rather than win. Moreover, since S
0
j = [0,∞), there is a set of bids
b−1 by the other buyers such that Buyer 1 strictly prefers to lose rather than win.
Thus the bid p is weakly dominated by the lower bid β1. Since this applies to any p > β1, in Step 1
we may delete every bid for Buyer 1 above β1. Therefore S
1
1 = [0, β1] and S
1
j = [0,∞] for each buyer
j ≥ 2.
For the induction hypothesis assume Si−1j = [0, βj ], for all j < i and S
i−1
j = [0,∞), for all j ≥ i.
Now take a losing buyer i and any set of bids b−i ∈ ×j:j 6=iS
i−1
j . Again, we have three cases:
(i) Both bids p and βi are winning bids against b−i. Then, as this is a second-price auction, buyer i is
indifferent between the two bids.
(ii) Both bids p and β1 are losing bids against b−i. Then buyer i is indifferent between the two bids.
(iii) Bid p is a winning bid but βi is a losing bid against b−i. Then since βi is a losing bid under the
tie-breaking rule, it must be the case that the winning bid is from a buyer j where j > i. But, by
definition of βi, there is no buyer j, with j > i, that buyer i wishes to beat at price βi.
So buyer i prefers the bid βi to the bid p. Moreover, since any buyer j : j > i has S
i−1
j = [0,∞),
this preference is strict for some feasible choice of bids for the other buyers. Thus, for buyer i, the bid
p is weakly dominated by the lower bid βi, and this applies to every p > βi. Ergo, in Step i we may
delete every bid for buyer i above βi. Therefore S
i
j = [0, βi], for all j < i+1 and S
i−1
j = [0,∞), for all
j ≥ i+1. The claim then follows by induction. So, for any losing buyer i we have that no bid greater
than βi survives the iterative deletion of strategies that are weakly dominated by a lower bid.
Observe that the above arguments also apply for the winning buyer, that is, buyer n. Except,
as there are no higher indexed buyers, it is not the case that βn strictly dominates any bid p > βn.
Indeed, buyer n is indifferent between all bids in the range [βn, γn], where γn is the maximum value
the buyer has for beating any buyer j with dropout bid βj = βn. Observe, γn does exist and is at
least βn by definition of the ascending price mechanism. Thus, for the winning bidder no bid greater
than γi survives the iterative deletion of strategies that are weakly dominated by a lower bid.
Second, we claim for any buyer i and any price q < βi there is no sequence of iterative deletions of
strategies that are weakly dominated by a lower bid that leads to the deletion of bid q from the feasible
strategy space of buyer i. If not, consider the first time τ that some buyer i has a value q ∈ [0, βi]
deleted from Sτi . We may assume that q is deleted because it is was weakly dominated by a lower bid
p < q. Now, by assumption, [0, βj ] ⊆ S
τ−1
j , for each buyer j. Furthermore, by definition, there is some
buyer k, with k > i that buyer i wishes to beat at any price below βi. In particular, Buyer i wishes to
beat Buyer k at price p. But since k > i we have βk ≥ βi. Recall that [0, βk] ⊆ S
τ−1
k . It immediately
follows that there is a set of feasible bids bk ∈ (p, q) and bj = 0, for all j /∈ {i, k} such that Buyer i
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strictly prefers to win against these bids. Specifically, the bid q is not weakly dominated by the bid p,
a contradiction.
It follows that the dropout bids form the focal subgame perfect equilibrium for both first-price and
second-price auctions with interdependent valuations.
We are now almost ready to be able to find equilibria in the sequential auction experiments we
will conduct. This, in turn, will allow us to present a sequential auction with non-monotonic prices.
Before doing so, one final factor remains to be discussed regarding the transition from equilibria in
auctions with interdependent valuations to equilibria in sequential auctions.
2.4 Equilibria in Sequential Auctions
2.4.1 Tie-Breaking Rules (and Data Structures!)
As stated, the dropout bid of each buyer is uniquely defined. However, our description of the ascending
auction may leave some flexibility in the choice of winner. Specifically, it may be the case that
simultaneously more than one buyer wishes to drop out of the auction. If this happens at the end of
the ascending price procedure then any of these buyers could be selected as the winner. An example
of this is shown in Figure 4.
Buyer 1
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
15
34
15
13 0
126
Figure 4: Tie-Breaking. An example that requires tie-breaking to determine the winner. The
drop-out bid vector is (15, 15, 15) but there are two possible winners, that is, either (15, 15+, 15) or
(15, 15, 15+).
This observation implies that to fully define the ascending auction procedure we must incorporate
a tie-breaking rule to order the buyers when more than one wish to drop out simultaneously. In an
auction with interdependent valuations the tie-breaking rule only affects the choice of winner, but
otherwise has no structural significance. However, in a sequential auction the choice of tie-breaking
rule may have much more significant consequences. Specifically, because each node in the game tree
corresponds to an auction with interdependent valuations, the choice of winner at one node may effect
the valuations at nodes higher in the tree. In particular, the equilibrium path may vary with different
tie-breaking rules, leading to different prices, winners, and utilities.
As we will show in Section 4.1 there are a massive number of tie-breaking rules, even in small
sequential auctions. We emphasize, however, that our main result holds regardless of the tie-breaking
rule. That is, for any tie-breaking rule there is a sequential auction on which it induces a non-
monotonic price trajectory. This we will also show in Section 4 after explaining mathematically how to
classify every tie-breaking rule in terms of labelled, directed acyclic graphs. First, though, we will show
that non-monotonic pricing occurs on the equilibrium path for perhaps the three most natural choices of
tie-breaking rule, namely preferential-ordering, first-in-first-out and last-in-first-out.
Interestingly these rules correspond to the fundamental data structures of priority queues, queues, and
stacks used in computer science.
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2.4.2 Tie-Breaking Rules and Data Structures
Preferential Ordering (Priority Queue): In preferential-ordering each buyer is given a dis-
tinct rank. In the case of a tie the buyer with the worst rank is eliminated. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that the ranks corresponding to a lexicographic ordering of the buyers. That is, the
rank of a buyer is its index label and given a tie amongst all the buyers that wish to dropout of
the auction we remove the buyer with the highest index. The preferential ordering tie-breaking rule
corresponds to the data structure known as a priority queue.
First-In-First-Out (Queue): The first-in-first-out tie-breaking rule corresponds to the data
structure known as a queue. The queue consists of those buyers in the auction that wish to dropout.
Amongst these, the buyer at the front of the queue is removed. If multiple buyers request to be added
to the queue simultaneously, they will be added lexicographically. Note though that this is different
from preferential ordering as the entire queue will not, in general, be ordered lexicographically. For
example, when at a fixed price p we remove the buyer i at the front of the queue this may cause new
buyers to wish to dropout at price p (i.e. those buyers who only wanted to beat buyer i). These new
buyers will be placed behind the other buyers already in the queue.
Last-In-First-Out (Stack): The last-in-first-out tie-breaking rule corresponds to the data
structure known as a stack. Again the stack consists of those buyers in the auction that wish to
dropout. Amongst these, the buyer at the top of the stack (i.e. the back of the queue) is removed. If
multiple buyers request to be added to the stack simultaneously, they will be added lexicographically.
At first glance, this last-in-first-out rule appears more unusual than the previous two, but it still
has a natural interpretation in terms of an auction. Namely, it corresponds to settings where the buyer
whose situation has changed most recently reacts the quickest.
In order to understand these tie-breaking rules it is useful to see how they apply on an example. In
Figure 5 the dropout vector is (β1, β2, β3, β4, β5) = (40, 40, 40, 40, 40), but the three tie-breaking rules
will select three different winners.
Buyer 1
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
Buyer 4
Buyer 5
25
83
34
31
38
31
74
91
40
37
1829
40
36
23
19
30
33 35
54
Figure 5: An Example to Illustrate the Three Tie-Breaking Rules.
On running the ascending price procedure, both Buyer 3 and Buyer 4 wish to drop out when the
price reaches 40. In preferential-ordering, our choice set is then {3, 4} and we remove the highest
index buyer, namely Buyer 4. With the removal of Buyer 4, neither Buyer 1 nor Buyer 5 have an
incentive to continue bidding so they both decide to dropout. Thus our choice set is now {1, 3, 5}
and preferential-ordering removes Buyer 5. Observe, with the removal of Buyer 5, that Buyer 2
no longer has an active participant it wishes to beat so the choice set is updated to {1, 2, 3}. The
preferential-ordering rule now removes the buyers in the order Buyer 3, then Buyer 2 and lastly
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Buyer 1. Thus Buyer 1 wins under the preferential-ordering rule.
Now consider first-in-first-out. To allow for a consistent comparison between the three meth-
ods, we assume that when multiple buyers are simultaneously added to the queue they are added in
decreasing lexicographical order. Thus our initial queue is 4 : 3 and first-in-first-out removes
Buyer 4 from the front of the queue. With the removal of Buyer 4, neither Buyer 1 nor Buyer 5 have
an incentive to continue bidding so they are added to the back of the queue. Thus the queue is now
3 : 5 : 1 and first-in-first-out removes Buyer 3 from the front of the queue. It then removes
Buyer 5 from the front of the queue. With the removal of Buyer 5, we again have that Buyer 2 now
wishes to dropout. Hence the queue is 1 : 2 and first-in-first-out then removes Buyer 1 from the
front of the queue and lastly removes Buyer 2. Thus Buyer 2 wins under the first-in-first-out
rule.
Finally, consider the last-in-first-out rule. Again, to allow for a consistent comparison we
assume that when multiple buyers are simultaneously added to the stack they are added in increasing
lexicographical order. Thus our initial stack is 43 and last-in-first-out removes Buyer 4 from the
top of the stack. Again, Buyer 1 and Buyer 5 both now wish to drop out so our stack becomes
5
1
3
.
Therefore Buyer 5 is next removed from the the top of the stack. At this point, Buyer 2 wishes to
dropout so the stack becomes
2
1
3
. The last-in-first-out rule now removes the buyers in the order
Buyer 2, then Buyer 1 and lastly Buyer 3. Thus Buyer 3 wins under the last-in-first-out rule.
We have now developed all the tools required to implement our sequential auction experiments. We
describe these experiments and their results in Section 5. Before doing so, we present in Section 3 one
sequential auction obtained via these experiments and verify that it leads to a non-monotonic price
trajectory with each of the three tie-breaking rules discussed above. We then explain in Section 4 how
to generalize this conclusion to apply to every tie-breaking rule.
3 An Auction with Non-Monotonic Prices
Here we prove that the decreasing price anomaly is not guaranteed for sequential auctions with more
than two buyers. Specifically, in Section 4 we prove the following result:
Theorem 3.1. For any tie-breaking rule, there is a sequential auction with non-monotonic prices.
In the rest of this section, we show that for all three of the tie-breaking rules discussed (namely,
preferential-ordering, first-in-first-out and last-in-first-out) there is a sequential auc-
tion with with non-monotonic prices. Specifically, we exhibit a sequential auction with three buyers
and eight items that exhibits non-monotonic prices.
Theorem 3.2. There is a sequential auction with non-monotonic prices for the preferential-ordering,
first-in-first-out and last-in-first-out tie-breaking rules.
Proof. Our counter-example to the conjecture is a sequential auction with three buyers and eight
identical items for sale. We present the first-price version where at equilibrium the buyers bid their
dropout values in each time period; as discussed, the same example extends to second-price auctions.
The valuations of the three buyers are defined as follows. Buyer 1 has marginal valuations {55,
55, 55, 55, 30, 20, 0, 0}, Buyer 2 has marginal valuations {32, 20, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, and Buyer 3 has
marginal valuations {44, 44, 44, 44, 0, 0, 0, 0}.
Let’s now compute the extensive forms of the auction under the three tie-breaking rules. We
begin with the preferential-ordering rule. To compute its extensive form, observe that Buyer 1 is
guaranteed to win at least two items in the auction because Buyer 2 and Buyer 3 together have positive
value for six items. Therefore, the feasible set of sink nodes in the extensive form representation are
shown in Figure 6.
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6: 270
2: 52
0: 0
6: 270
1: 32
1: 44
6: 270
0: 0
2: 88
5: 250
2: 52
1: 44
5: 250
1: 32
2: 88
5: 250
0: 0
3: 132
4: 220
2: 52
2: 88
4: 220
1: 32
3: 132
4: 220
0: 0
4: 176
3: 165
2: 52
3: 132
3: 165
1: 32
4: 176
2: 110
2: 52
4: 176
Figure 6: Sink Nodes of the Extensive Form Game.
Given the valuations at the sink nodes we can work our way upwards recursively calculating the
values at the other nodes in the extensive form representation. For example, consider the node
(x1, x2, x3) = (4, 1, 2). This node has three children, namely (5, 1, 2), (4, 2, 2) and (4, 1, 3); see Fig-
ure 7(a). These induce a three-buyer auction as shown in Figure 7(b). This can be solved using the
ascending price procedure to find the dropout bids for each buyer. Thus we obtain that the value
for the node (x1, x2, x3) = (4, 1, 2) is as shown in Figure 7(c). Of course this node is particularly
simple as, for the final round of the sequential auction, the corresponding auction with interdependent
valuations is just a standard auction. That is, when the final item is sold, for any buyer i the value
vi,j is independent of the buyer j 6= i.
(a)
4: -
1: -
2: -
5: 250
1: 32
2: 88
4: 220
2: 52
2: 88
4: 220
1: 32
3: 132
(b) Buyer 1
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
30
20
30
20 44
44
(c)
4: 127
1: 32
2: 48
5: 250
1: 32
2: 88
4: 220
2: 52
2: 88
4: 220
1: 32
3: 132
30 20 30+
Figure 7: Solving a Subgame above the Sinks.
Nodes higher up the game tree correspond to more complex auctions with interdependent valua-
tions. For example, the case of the source node (x1, x2, x3) = (0, 0, 0) is shown in Figure 8. In this
case, on applying the ascending price procedure, Buyer 1 is the first to dropout at price 15. At this
point, both Buyer 2 and Buyer 3 no longer have a competitor that they wish to beat at this price, so
they both want to dropout. With the preferential-ordering tie-breaking rule, Buyer 2 wins the
item.
0: -
0: -
0: -
1: 125
0: 1
0: 66
0: 110
1: 35
0: 176
0: 110
0: 22
1: 176
Buyer 1
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
15
34
15
13 0
110
0: 110
0: 22
0: 176
1: 125
0: 1
0: 66
0: 110
1: 35
0: 176
0: 110
0: 22
1: 176
15 15+ 15
Figure 8: Solving the Subgame at the Root.
Using similar arguments at each node verifies the concise extensive form representation under the
preferential-ordering tie-breaking rule shown Figure 9. In this figure, the white nodes represent
subgames where the sequential auction still has three active buyers; the pink nodes represent subgames
with at most two active buyers; the yellow nodes are the sink nodes. Again, the equilibrium path with
non-monotonic prices is shown in bold. Now consider this equilibrium path. Observe that Buyer 2
wins the first two items, Buyer 3 wins the next four items and Buyer 1 wins the final two items. The
resultant price trajectory is {15, 17, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}. That is, the price rises and then falls to zero – a
non-monotonic price trajectory.
Exactly the same example works with the other two tie-breaking rules. The extensive form repre-
sentation with the first-in-first-out rule is shown in Figure 17 in Appendix B; the extensive form
representation with the last-in-first-out rule is shown in Figure 18 in Appendix B.
Notice the node values under preferential-ordering and first-in-first-out are exactly the
same. This is despite the fact that these two rules do produce different winners at some nodes, for
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Figure 9: Non-Monotonic Prices with the preferential-ordering Rule.
example the node (3, 0, 2). In contrast, the last-in-first-out rule gives an extensive for where
some nodes have different valuations than those produced by the other two rules. For example, for the
node (2, 0, 0) and its subgame the equilibrium paths and their prices differ in Figure 17 and Figure 18.
However, for all three rules the equilibrium path and price trajectory for the whole game is exactly
the same. We remark that these observations will play a role when we prove that, for any tie-breaking
rule, there is a sequential auction with non-monotonic prices.
Again, we emphasize that there is nothing inherently perverse about this example. The form
of the valuation functions, namely decreasing marginal valuations, is standard. As explained, the
equilibrium concept studied is the appropriate one for sequential auctions. Finally, the non-monotonic
price trajectory is not the artifact of an aberrant tie-breaking rule; we will now prove that non-
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monotonic prices are exhibited under any tie-breaking rule.
4 Non-Monotonic Prices under General Tie-Breaking Rules
Next we prove that for any tie-breaking rule there is a sequential auction on which it produces a
non-monotonic price trajectory. To do this, we must first formally define the set of all tie-breaking
rules.
4.1 Classifying the set of Tie-Breaking Rules
Our definition of the set of tie-breaking rules will utilize the concept of an overbidding graph, introduced
by Paes Leme et al. [23]. For any price p and any set of bidders S, the overbidding graph G(S, p)
contains a labelled vertex for each buyer in S and an arc (i, j) if and only if vi,i−p > vi,j. For example,
recall the auction with interdependent valuations seen in Figure 5. This is reproduced in Figure 10
along with its overbidding graph G({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, 40) in Figure 10.
Buyer 1
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
Buyer 4
Buyer 5
25
83
34
31
38
31
74
91
40
37
1829
40
36
23
19
30
33 35
54
1
2
34
5
Figure 10: The Overbidding Graph G({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, 40).
But what does the overbidding graph have to do with tie-breaking rules? First, recall that the
drop-out bid βi is unique for any buyer i, regardless of the tie-breaking rule. Consequently, whilst
the tie-breaking rule will also be used to order buyers that are eliminated at prices below the final
price p∗, such choices are irrelevant with regards to the final winner. Thus, the only relevant factor
is how a decision rule selects a winner from amongst those buyers S∗ whose drop-out bids are p∗.
Second, recall that at the final price p∗ the remaining buyers are eliminated one-by-one until there
is a single winner. However, a buyer cannot be eliminated if there remains another buyer still in the
auction that it wishes to beat at price p∗. That is, buyer i must be eliminated after buyer j if there is
an arc (i, j) in the overbidding graph. Thus, the order of eliminations given by the tie-breaking rule
must be consistent with the overbidding graph. In particular, the winner can only be selected from
amongst the source vertices2 in the overbidding graph G(S∗, p∗). For example, in Figure 10 the source
vertices are {1, 2, 3}. Note that this explains why the tie-breaking rules preferential-ordering,
first-in-first-out and last-in-first-out chose Buyer 1, Buyer 2 and Buyer 3 as winners but
none of them selected Buyer 4 or Buyer 5. Observe that the overbidding graph G(S∗, p∗) is acyclic; if
it contained a directed cycle then the price in the ascending auction would be forced to rise further.
Because every directed acyclic graph contains at least one source vertex, any tie-breaking rule does
have at least one choice for winner.
Thus a tie-breaking rule is simply a function τ : H → σ(H). Here the domain of the function is
the set of labelled, directed acyclic graphs and σ(H) is the set of source nodes in H. Consequently,
two tie-breaking rules are equivalent if they correspond to the same function τ . We are now ready to
present our main result.
2A source is a vertex v with in-degree zero; that is, there no arcs pointing into v.
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4.2 Non-Monotonic Prices for Any Tie-Breaking Rule
Theorem 4.1. For any tie-breaking rule τ , there is a sequential auction on which it produces non-
monotonic prices.
Proof. We consider exactly the same example as in Theorem 3.2. That is, we have three buyers and
eight items where Buyer 1 has marginal valuations {55, 55, 55, 55, 30, 20, 0, 0}, Buyer 2 has marginal
valuations {32, 20, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, and Buyer 3 has marginal valuations {44, 44, 44, 44, 0, 0, 0, 0}.
First let’s calculate how many tie-breaking rules there are for this auction. To count this we must
consider all directed acyclic graphs with labels in {1, 2, 3}. Note that we must have at least two buyers
with drop-out values equal to the final price p∗ otherwise the auction would have terminated earlier.
Thus it suffices to consider directed acyclic graphs with either two or three vertices. There are 8 such
topologies that produce 34 labelled directed acyclic graphs and 12, 288 tie-breaking rules! This is all
illustrated in Table 1.
Directed
Acyclic
Graph
x
y
x
y
x
y
z
x
y
z
x
y
z
y
z
x x
y
z
x
y
z
Total #
Labelled
DAGs
Total #
Tie-
Breaking
Rules
#
Labelled
Graphs
3 6 1 6 6 3 3 6 34 121· 212· 31
= 12, 288
# Sources 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 1
Table 1: Labelled Directed Acyclic Graphs
Luckily we do not need to examine all these tie-breaking rules separately. It turns out that the set
of tie-breaking rules can be partitioned into exactly ten classes. Specifically, any tie-breaking rule pro-
duces one of just ten possible (in terms of distinct node valuations) extensive forms for this sequential
auction. Two of these we have seen before. The first is the extensive form shown in Figure 9 (and also
shown in Figure 17) that is produced by both preferential-ordering and first-in-first-out.
The second is the extensive form shown in Figure 18 produced by last-in-first-out.
Let’s explain why there are only eight other feasible extensive forms. For any tie-breaking rule,
as we work up from the sink nodes there are many nodes where the tie-breaking rule is required.
Given this fact, why doesn’t the total number of distinct extensive forms blow-up multiplicatively?
As previously alluded to, when we apply a tie-breaking rule there are two possibilities that arise. In
the first possibility, the node valuations are the same regardless of which buyer is selected by the rule.
Indeed this is why preferential-ordering and first-in-first-out can produce the same extensive
form. For an example, consider the node (3, 0, 2) where Buyer 1 wins with preferential-ordering
but Buyer 3 wins with first-in-first-out; in either case the node valuations are identical, namely
(188, 0, 112) as shown in Figures 9 and 17. For our purpose, such nodes are no importance.
(A) (B) (C) (D)
1
2 3
2 3 1 2 3
1 2
3
Figure 11: The Four Critical Overbidding Graphs.
In the second possibility, the node valuations do vary depending upon which buyer is selected by
the tie-breaking rule. It turns out, however, that of the 34 labelled directed acyclic graphs only 4 of
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these overbidding graphs affect the extensive form node valuations. These four critical overbidding
graphs, which we call A,B,C and D, are shown in Figure 11.
So why are these these the only four overbidding graphs that matter? The reader may verify
that, working upwards from the sink nodes, the first such nodes where the choice of tie-breaking rule
matters occur at depth 4. Specifically, at the three nodes (4, 0, 0), (1, 0, 3) and (0, 1, 3). Now the nodes
(1, 0, 3) and (0, 1, 3) both correspond to the overbidding graph A whilst the node (4, 0, 0) corresponds
to the overbidding graph B. For the overbidding graph A the tie-breaking rule must select either the
sink vertex 2 or the sink vertex 3 to win. Moreover, by definition, it must make the same choice at
both (1, 0, 3) and (0, 1, 3). Furthermore, regardless of this choice, as we work up the extensive form
the nodes (1, 0, 2), (0, 1, 2), (0, 0, 3), (0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 2), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) and (0, 0, 0) also all have the
overbidding graph A and, thus, must also have the same winner.
Node (4,0,0)
DAG: B
Node (3,0,0)
DAG: D
Node (3,0,0)
DAG: C
Node (2,0,0)
DAG: D
Node (2,0,0)
DAG: D
Node (2,0,0)
DAG: C
Node (2,0,0)
DAG: D
Node (1,0,3)
DAG: A
Node (1,0,3)
DAG: A
Node (1,0,3)
DAG: A
Node (1,0,3)
DAG: A
Node (1,0,3)
DAG: A
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
2 wins 3 wins
1 wins 2 wins
1 or 3 wins
2 wins
1 wins 2 wins 1 or 3 wins 1 wins 2 wins
2 wins 3 wins
2 wins 3 wins
2 wins 3 wins
2 wins 3 wins
2 wins 3 wins
Preferential
Ordering;
First-in
-first-out
Last-in
-first-out
See Figure 19
Figure 12: Monotonic Prices: Yes or No? A Decision Tree Partitioning the Tie-Breaking Rules into
Ten Classes.
The choice of winner at (4, 0, 0) for overbidding graph B is also between Buyer 2 and Buyer 3, but
in this case, the effect is more subtle. If Buyer 2 wins then the overbidding graph D is induced at node
(3, 0, 0), whereas if Buyer 3 wins then the overbidding graph C is induced at (3, 0, 0). In the former
case, the overbidding graph D arises at node (2, 0, 0) regardless the choice of winner at (3, 0, 0). In
the latter case, there are three possible winners in the overbidding graph C at (3, 0, 0). If Buyer 1 or
Buyer 3 win these produce the same node valuations and give the overbidding graph C at (2, 0, 0); if
Buyer 2 wins this gives the overbidding graph D at (2, 0, 0). A decision tree showing all the possible
choices is shown in Figure 12. The reader may verify that these are the only decisions that affect the
valuations at the nodes. Thus there are ten possible extensive forms, where Yes/No details whether or
not a monotonic price trajectory is produced. Where the tie-breaking rules preferential-ordering,
first-in-first-out, and last-in-first-out fit in this decision tree are highlighted in the figure.
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Several observations are in order. First, not all of the classes of tie-breaking rule give non-monotonic
price trajectories. An example of a tie-breaking rule with monotonic prices is shown in Figure 19.
In fact, the choices made on the overbidding graphs B,C and D only affect valuations on nodes off
the equilibrium path. The equilibrium path itself is determined uniquely by the choice made for the
overbidding graph A. If the winner there is Buyer 2 then the prices are non-monotonic; if the winner
there is Buyer 3 then the prices are monotonic.
We are now ready to complete the proof of the theorem. As we have just seen, any tie-breaking rule
can be classified into one of ten classes depending upon its choices on this sequential auction. Five
of the classes lead to non-monotonic prices on this instance. For the other five classes of tie-breaking
rule we need to construct different examples on which they induces non-monotonic prices. But this is
easy to do! Take exactly the same example but with the labels of Buyer 2 and Buyer 3 interchanged.
The equilibrium paths for this sequential auction using any rule in the other five classes will then have
non-monotonic price trajectories.
4.3 Negative Utilities and Overbidding
We now discuss a couple of interesting observations that arise from this specific sequential auction.
First we recall another interesting property of two-buyer sequential auctions: in each round of the auc-
tion each buyer has a non-negative value for winning the item over the other agent [11]. Interestingly,
this property also fails to hold for multi-buyer sequential auctions!
Theorem 4.2. There are multi-buyer sequential auctions with weakly decreasing marginal valuations
that have subgames where one agent has a negative value for winning against one other agent.
Proof. Consider again the sequential auction shown in Figure 19 in Appendix B. Focus upon the
auctions with interdependent valuations corresponding to the subgames rooted at the nodes (0, 1, 0),
(0, 1, 1) and (0, 1, 2). In all three cases, Buyer 3 has a negative value from winning over Buyer 2.
For example, at node (0, 1, 0) Buyer 3 has a utility of 131 for winning but a utility of 176 if Buyer 2
wins. (Note that Buyer 3 does have a positive value for defeating Buyer 1, specifically 131− 48 = 83.)
Of course, this also implies there are sequential auctions with weakly decreasing marginal valuations
functions where one agent has a negative value for winning the first item over one other agent.
Second, observe in Figure 9 (see also Figure 8) that in the first round Buyer 3 has a value of
176 − 66 = 110 for winning over Buyer 1. This far exceeds her marginal value of 44 for obtaining
one item. A similar property can be seen in Figures 17 and 18 of Appendix B. Such “overbidding”
also arises in two-buyer sequential auctions. The reader may wonder, however, whether this type
of “overbidding” is responsible for the generation of non-monotonic price trajectories in multi-buyer
auctions. This is not the case. To verify this we repeated all six million experiments described in
Section 5 with the ascending price mechanism modified to exclude the possibility of a buyer bidding
higher than their marginal value for their next unit of the good. The proportion of instances with
non-monotonic price trajectories was similar (roughly 10% less). Moreover, there are instances where
such “overbidding” does not arise but where the prices are non-monotonic.
5 Experiments
Our experiments were based on a dataset of over six million multi-buyer sequential auctions with non-
increasing valuation functions randomly generated from different natural discrete probability distribu-
tions. Our goal was to observe the proportion of non-monotonic price trajectories in these sequential
auctions and to see how this varied with (i) the number of buyers, (ii) the number of items, (iii) the
distribution of valuation functions, and (iv) the tie-breaking rule. To do this, for each auction, we
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computed the subgame perfect equilibrium corresponding to the dropout bids and evaluated the prices
along the equilibrium path to test for non-monotonicity. We repeated this test for each of the three
tie breaking rules described in Section 2.4.1, namely preferential-ordering, first-in-first-out
and last-in-first-out. The results from our 6,240,000 randomly generated sequential auctions are
shown in Figure 13 in Appendix C.
5.1 Dataset Generation
We now describe the methods used to generate our auction dataset. Our generator was implemented in
C++11, using the GNU Compiler Collection (version 5.1.0) and the standard random number library.
The random number library provides classes that generate pseudo-random numbers. These classes
include both uniform random bit generators (URBGs), which generate integer sequences with a uniform
distribution, and random number distributions, which convert the output of a URBG into various
statistical distributions (such as uniform, binomial or Poisson distributions). In our experiments,
we used the MT19937-64 implementation of the widely-used Mersenne Twister URBG [19] along
with the standard uniform int distribution, binomial distribution and poisson distribution
classes to generate the valuation functions in the dataset. We restricted our attention to integral non-
increasing marginal valuations and bounded the maximum marginal value of a single item by 100. The
purpose of this choice of constraints was to allow for a wide variety of auction instances whilst still
allowing for a reasonable chance for ties to arise in the ascending auction mechanism, thus enabling
us to observe any potential effects of varying the tie-breaking rule.
Our dataset contains auctions with n = 3, 4 and 5 different buyers. For the 3-buyer case, we varied
the number T of items from T = 2 to T = 16. For each auction size, we generated a total of 240, 000
instances. Specifically, let Vi be the valuation function of buyer i, that is, Vi(0) = 0 and Vi assigns a
non-negative value for every integer ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ T , corresponding to buyer i’s value for any set of ℓ items.
Let vi(ℓ) be the marginal value of buyer i for winning an ℓ
th item, that is, vi(ℓ) = Vi(ℓ)−Vi(ℓ−1). We
used the three aforementioned distributions to each generate 80, 000 sets of valuation functions. To
generate the values vi(ℓ), for each buyer i we first uniformly selected a maximum marginal value wi in
the interval [1, 100]. For half the instances, we generated wi independently for every player, and for the
other half, we made wi equal for all players. Subsequently, for each buyer i, we chose the number of
nonzero valuations mi uniformly in [1, T ]. For the first distribution, we then independently generated
and sorted mi values uniformly in [1, wi], and padded this sequence with T −mi zeros, to generate a
decreasing integer sequence: the valuation function for buyer i. For the second distribution, for each
buyer i we generated mi values from a binomial distribution with parameters n = wi and p = 0.5, and
sorted and padded this sequence with T −mi zeros. For the third distribution, we let ui,1 = wi, and
for each j ≥ 2 we let ui,j = max(0, ui,j−1 − xj), where xj was drawn from a Poisson distribution with
parameter λ = wi
mi
.
The above steps were repeated for the 4-buyer and 5-buyer cases, varying the number of items from
T = 2 to T = 12 in each case. In each of these cases, we generated a total of 120, 000 instances for
each auction size, with 40, 000 instances generated from each of the three distributions.
Let us comment on the reasoning behind these choices for the sizes of our auctions. Our sequential
auctions, with at most five bidders and at most ten items, could be solved extremely quickly; this
allowed us to analyze our large dataset. But it can be shown that the number of nodes in the
extensive form for a sequential auction with n buyers and T items is exactly
T∑
t=0
(
t+ n− 1
n− 1
)
=
(
T + n
n
)
=
(
T + n
T
)
Thus the size of the extensive form grows exponentially in the number of buyers and the number of
items. So, whilst with additional time we can easily solve slightly larger instances, we cannot expect
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to solve significantly larger instances. We remark that the auction sizes we can solve are comparable
to many of the real sequential auctions described in the Introduction.
5.2 Experimental Results
The results from our 6,240,000 randomly generated sequential auctions are shown in Figure 13. In these
bar charts there is one bar for each combination of auction size and data structure (preferential-ordering,
first-in-first-out and last-in-first-out). Each bar shows the number of auctions of that type
that induced non-monotonic prices. For three buyers there were 240,000 sequential auctions gener-
ated of each type. For example, for sequential auctions with three buyers and five items that use the
preferential-ordering tie-breaking rule, there were 7 auctions out of 240,000 that had non-monotonic
prices. For four and five buyers there were 120,000 auctions of each type.
Figure 13 shows all the tests together. Recall that the valuation functions in each sequential auction
were generated in one of three different ways (uniform, Poisson, binomial). In Appendix C, we show
in Figure 20, Figure 21 and Figure 22 these three cases for 3-buyer, 4-buyer and 5-buyer sequential
auctions respectively. We found no examples with less than 5 items that showed non-monotonicity, so
the cases T = 2, 3, 4 are omitted.
As can be observed, for a fixed number of buyers, there is a slight upward drift in the proportion of
non-monotonic price trajectories as the number of items increases. Intuitively that seems unsurprising,
as with longer price sequences there are more time periods at which deviations from monotonicity can
arise. A very interesting question would be to study the limit of the proportion of non-monotonic
price trajectories as the number of items gets very large. Unfortunately, due to the exponential
explosion in the number of game tree nodes discussed above, this is a question that cannot be studied
experimentally.
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Figure 13: Bar Charts showing the Frequency of Non-Monotonic Price Trajectories
The main conclusion to be drawn from these experiments is that non-monotonic prices are extremely
rare. Of the 6,240,000 auctions, the preferential-ordering tie-breaking rule produced just 1,100
violations of the declining price anomaly. The first-in-first-out rule gave 986 violations and the
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last-in-first-out rule gave 1,334 violations. The overall observed rate of non-monotonicity over
these 18 million tests was 0.000183.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that the declining price anomaly does not always hold in multi-buyer sequential
auctions. This result provides an explanation for the difficulty hitherto of obtaining quantitative
analyses of multi-buyer sequential auctions. Our experiments show that the declining price anomaly
is very rarely violated in randomly generated sequential auctions.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we prove the claim that in a second-price auction with interdependent valuations it
may be the case that no strategies survive the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies if we
allow domination to be by a higher bid.
Theorem 6.1. There are second-price auctions with interdependent valuations where no strategies
survive the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies
Proof. Consider the 3-buyer auction with interdependent valuations shown in Figure 14.
Buyer 1
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
1
4
2
3 5
6
Figure 14: A second-price auction with interdependent valuations where no strategies survive the iter-
ative deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
Let’s now examine what happens when we use the two different orderings illustrated in Figure 15
to delete weakly dominated strategies.
Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3
S0 [0,∞) [0,∞) [0,∞)
S1 [0,∞) [0,∞) [0, 5] \ [1, 2]
S2 {1} [0,∞) [0, 5] \ [1, 2]
Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3
S0 [0,∞) [0,∞) [0,∞)
S1 [0,∞) [0, 4] \ [1, 2] [0,∞)
S2 {2} [0, 4] \ [1, 2] [0,∞)
Figure 15: Two processes that together eliminate every strategy for Buyer 1.
Consider first the iterative process on the LHS of Figure 15. Observe that Buyer 3 is willing to pay
6 to beat Buyer 1 and 5 to beat Buyer 2. It follows that any bid above 6 is weakly dominated by a bid
of 6. Moreover, as this is a second-price auction, any bid below 5 is weakly dominated by a bid of 5
(we emphasize that this latter fact does not hold in the case of first-price auctions). Now, rather than
deleting all these bids immediately, imagine that Buyer 3 deletes any bid over 6 and any bid between
1 and 2. Therefore S13 = [0, 6] \ [1, 2]. At this stage the undeleted strategies for Buyer 1 and Buyer 2
remain S11 = S
1
2 = [0,∞).
Next observe that Buyer 1 is willing to pay at most 1 to beat Buyer 2 but up to 2 to beat Buyer 3.
Because this is a second-price auction, it immediately follows that any bid below one or above two
is weakly dominated. Now let’s compare the outcomes for Buyer 1 between bidding 1 and bidding
x ∈ (1, 2]. If Buyer 2 and Buyer 3 are both bidding below one then Buyer 1 wins with a bid of 1 or a
bid of x. If either Buyer 2 or Buyer 3 is bidding greater than x then Buyer 1 loses with a bid of 1 or
a bid of x. So suppose the highest bid from Buyer 2 and Buyer 3 is between 1 and x. If this highest
bid is from Buyer 2 then Buyer 1 would prefer to lose and so bidding 1 is preferable to bidding x. On
the other hand, if this highest bid is from Buyer 3 then Buyer 1 would prefer to lose and so bidding
x is preferable to bidding 1. But the latter case cannot happen as the strategy space of Buyer 3 is
currently S13 = [0, 5] \ [1, 2]. It follows that bidding 1 weakly dominates bidding x. Hence we can set
S21 = {1}.
Next consider the iterative process on the RHS of Figure 15. This time let’s begin by deleting
strategies of Buyer 2 that are weakly dominated. Observe that Buyer 2 is willing to pay 4 to beat
Buyer 1 and 3 to beat Buyer 3. Let’s imagine that Buyer 2 now deletes any bid over 4 and any bid
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between 1 and 2. Therefore S12 = [0, 4] \ [1, 2]. At this stage the undeleted strategies for Buyer 1 and
Buyer 3 remain S11 = S
1
3 = [0,∞).
In the next step consider Buyer 1. Again, bidding less than one or above two is weakly dominated.
This time let’s compare the outcomes for Buyer 1 between bidding 2 and bidding x ∈ [1, 2). If Buyer 2
and Buyer 3 are both bidding below x then Buyer 1 wins with a bid of 2 or a bid of x. If either Buyer 2
or Buyer 3 is bidding greater than 2 then Buyer 1 loses with a bid of 2 or a bid of x. So suppose the
highest bid from Buyer 2 and Buyer 3 is between x and 2. If this highest bid is from Buyer 2 then
Buyer 1 would prefer to lose and so bidding x is preferable to bidding 2. On the other hand, if this
highest bid is from Buyer 3 then Buyer 1 would prefer to win and so bidding 2 is preferable to bidding
x. But the former case cannot happen as the strategy space of Buyer 2 is currently S12 = [0, 4] \ [1, 2].
If follows that bidding 2 weakly dominates bidding x. Hence we can set S23 = {2}.
But {1} ∩ {2} = ∅. Therefore, no strategy for Buyer 1 survives the iterative deletion of weakly-
dominated strategies. That is, for each bid value b there is a sequence of iterative deletions of weakly-
dominated strategies that deletes the bid b of Buyer 1.
Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3
S0 [0,∞) [0,∞) [0,∞)
S1 [0,∞) [0,∞) [0, 5] \ [3, 4]
S2 [0,∞) {4} [0, 5] \ [3, 4]
Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3
S0 [0,∞) [0,∞) [0,∞)
S1 [0, 2] [0,∞) [0,∞)
S2 [0, 2] {3} [0,∞)
Figure 16: Two processes that together eliminate every strategy for Buyer 2.
We remark that, for this example, similar arguments show that no bid for Buyer 2 survives the
iterative deletion of weakly-dominated strategies. In particular, the two processes shown in Figure 16
lead to non-intersecting, undeleted, strategy sets for Buyer 2.
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we present the three remaining extensive forms referenced in the main text.
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Figure 17: Non-Monotonic Prices with the first-in-first-out Rule.
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Figure 18: Non-Monotonic Prices with the last-in-first-out Rule.
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Figure 19: A Tie-Breaking Rule with Monotonic Prices.
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Appendix C
In this appendix, we present the results for the three distributions (uniform, Poisson, binomial) for
3-buyer, 4-buyer and 5-buyer sequential auctions.
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(a) 3 buyers, uniform distribution
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(b) 3 buyers, Poisson step-size distribution
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(c) 3 buyers, binomial distribution
Figure 20: Frequency of Non-Monotonic Price Trajectories in 3-Buyer Auctions
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(a) 4 buyers, uniform distribution
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(b) 4 buyers, Poisson step-size distribution
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(c) 4 buyers, binomial distribution
Figure 21: Frequency of Non-Monotonic Price Trajectories in 4-Buyer Auctions
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(a) 5 buyers, uniform distribution
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(b) 5 buyers, Poisson step-size distribution
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Figure 22: Frequency of Non-Monotonic Price Trajectories in 5-Buyer Auctions
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